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483 
FAITH IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
Shami Chakrabarti 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
When people discuss different equality rights conflicting with 
each other, they often have in mind conflicts between religious 
beliefs and gender or sexual orientation rights. Conflicts between 
other equality rights seem (so far at least) to arise less frequently. 
Economic difficulties and increased competition for resources 
may change this, but my right not to be discriminated against (at 
least directly) on the grounds of my sex or race rarely causes 
difficulties for others. Equally, it is difficult to think of examples 
where preventing discrimination on the grounds of disability, 
sexual orientation, or age will involve significant compromise to 
someone else’s protected rights. 
The challenge (and the point) of religious and philosophical 
beliefs is that they inevitably invoke moral structures, which are 
not universally shared, and which may not be reflected in modern 
legal norms. For example, many religions are based on ancient 
doctrines reflecting patriarchal ideals. This inevitably leads to 
conflict between those beliefs and the rights of people of different 
faiths or consciences, women, or gay people. 
But these specific and predictable conflicts are not the only 
problems. Issues of particular faith identity (or the lack thereof) 
seem to have become particular sore points in our cultural 
discourse at both the national and local level. You hear of people 
taking personal exception to accommodations being granted to a 
fellow employee on the grounds of his or her religion. Their 
reasoning is that it’s “not fair” for someone to be allowed time 
                                                          
* Shami Chakrabarti has been the Director of the U.K. human rights group 
Liberty since September 2003. 
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off for religious observance when others are not allowed to leave 
early, for example, to play sport. I suspect you would not hear 
the same complaints—at least not so publicly—about 
accommodations being made for disabled employees or perhaps 
even for female colleagues with childcare difficulties. 
Ten years ago, the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations of 20031 came into force in the U.K., and have 
subsequently been superseded by the Equality Act of 2010.2 It has 
also been thirteen years since the Human Rights Act of 1998 
came into force incorporating Article 9 (freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights into the U.K.’s domestic law.3 The cases about faith in the 
public sphere have generated some of the most outspoken 
commentary, in part because of the huge divergence in views 
towards religion in the U.K. 
Some people have adopted a new breed of aggressive 
secularism (perhaps an inevitable instinctive response to the rise 
of international fundamentalist Christian and Islamic movements) 
that seeks to eradicate religion from public life altogether.4 
Meanwhile, there are substantial minorities of individuals with 
strongly held religious beliefs involving strict doctrine and 
practice. Some traditionalists mourn a perceived decline in the 
Church of England as dominant faith in the land.5  
Others have encouraged a political and legislative culture that 
conflates irritation, offence, alarm and distress, as evidenced by 
our public order and anti-social behavior statute books and 
                                                          
1 The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations, 2003, S.I. 
1660, § 2 (U.K.). 
2 The Equality Act, 2010, c. 15 (U.K.). 
3 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 6 (U.K.). 
4 See, e.g., Christina Odone, The New Intolerance: Will We Regret 
Pushing Christians Out of Public Life, NEW STATESMAN (Jan.  14, 2014, 
11:12 AM), http://www.newstatesman.com/2014/01/pushing-christians-out-
public-life-new-intolerance. 
5 See, e.g., George Carey, An Age When All Faiths are Equal –  
Except Christianity, MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 31, 2013, 7:43 PM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.U.K./debate/article-2482441/An-age-faiths-equal--
Christianity-As-judge-says-Christian-morality-place-courts-stinging-riposte-
Archbishop-Canterbury.html. 
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promotes a general fear of difference and dissent.6 This in turn 
produces both the nonsense of nervous “Winterval” celebrations7 
and the disgrace of a young British man being arrested for calling 
Scientology a cult.8 There has also been an increase in hostility 
towards religious minorities which has manifested itself recently 
in calls to ban the wearing of the burkha in public places, most 
vocally and stringently in continental Europe, but also in the 
U.K.9 
Society has three choices in dealing with the question of the 
extent to which people have the right to express their religion in 
the public sphere. The first choice is to select and elevate an 
approved faith to the point of giving it dominant status over all 
other belief systems. That faith is completely and formally 
interweaved into the entire legal, political, and social system—
every sphere of public life and as much of private life as can be 
achieved. An extreme example might be Afghanistan under the 
Taliban, and a more moderate example would be Britain at earlier 
stages in its history. 
The second option is in many ways both equal and opposite. 
It is based on the view that faith conviction should be viewed as 
dangerous and divisive. If faith conviction cannot be eradicated 
altogether, it must be chased from the public to the private 
sphere—confined to a place of worship, the home, or upstairs 
under the bed with the pornography. An extreme example would 
be Stalin’s Russia, and a more moderate one would be the French 
                                                          
6 See, e.g., George Monbiot, At Last, A Law to Stop Almost Anyone 
From Doing Almost Anything, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2014, 2:30 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/06/law-to-stop-eveyone-
everything. 
7 Winterval was the name given to Birmingham City Council public 
events in 1997 and 1998. “Winterval” has since become shorthand in the U.K. 
for attempts to “rebrand” Christmas so as not to exclude non-Christians. 
8 See Anil Danwar, Teenager Faces Prosecution for Calling  
Scientology “Cult,” THE GUARDIAN (May 20, 2008, 4:53 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/U.K./2008/may/20/1. 
9 See, e.g., George Eaton, Tory MP’s Ban the Burqa  
Bill Reaches Parliament, NEW STATESMAN (Sept. 6, 2013), 
http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/09/tory-mps-ban-burqa-bill-
reaches-parliament.  
2014.04.24 CHAKRABARTI.DOCX 5/11/2014  11:38 AM 
486 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Republic. 
There is also a third option: a more human rights-based 
approach and one that resonates well with a society like Britain,  
a country where the struggle for religious freedom has been so 
connected with the struggle for democracy itself. 
Human beings are creatures of faith and logic, emotion and 
reason, and this is reflected in the law. It may be true that 
religion has inspired considerable war and prejudice, but it has 
also been responsible for art, music, and compassion. While 
scientists and engineers have produced some of the greatest 
advancements in human history, their work has also been the 
stuff of nightmares. If we really believe in freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion, then such freedom  must include the 
right to the faith or belief of your choice, the right to no faith, 
and crucially, to be a heretic to any religion.  
Inseparable, enumerated rights like freedom of conscience, 
expression, and association, and the right to private and family 
life, all flow from foundational human rights ideals of dignity, 
equal treatment, and fairness. Lord Nicholls in Williamson (a 
case concerning corporal punishment in schools) said: 
Religious and other beliefs and convictions are part 
of the humanity of every individual. They are an 
integral part of his personality and individuality. In 
a civilised society individuals respect each other’s 
beliefs. This enables them to live in harmony. This 
is one of the hallmarks of a civilised society. 
Unhappily, all too often this hallmark has been 
noticeable by its absence. Mutual tolerance has had 
a chequered history even in recent times. The 
history of most countries, if not all, has been 
marred by the evil consequences of religious and 
other intolerance.10 
Some of those historical examples highlight one of the largest 
dangers that can arise from religious discrimination, namely 
religion being used as a proxy for race. Sadly, this is not a 
                                                          
10 Regina (Williamson & Others) v. Sec’y of State for Educ. & Emp’t, 
[2005] UKHL 15, at [15] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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phenomenon confined to history, as is amply demonstrated by the 
evolving—and increasingly toxic—debate on the wearing of the 
burkha in public spaces, which is considered below. 
As with other forms of individual expression and autonomy, 
we should be slow to interfere with the expression or 
manifestation of any religious or other belief—doing so only 
when such intervention is necessary and proportionate to 
protecting the rights and freedoms of others. This can of course 
be a difficult exercise in practice, and there are a collection of 
core issues which have proved consistently controversial.  
In this Article, I focus on two issues. First, I consider what 
religious and philosophical beliefs the law deems to be worthy of 
protection. I will look at cases that discuss the scope of 
“philosophical belief” in the U.K. Employment Appeal Tribunal, 
the seminal decision of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Eweida v. United Kingdom,11 which considers the issue of beliefs 
held by relatively few people, and a subsequent decision in a 
U.K. Tax Tribunal on the same issue. Second, I consider how far 
the law requires us to go to protect the manifestation of those 
beliefs. Specifically, I will analyze the legal position of public 
officials and business owners providing services to the public and 
the rights of individuals to wear religious clothing in public, both 
in the U.K. and in France. Finally, I will conclude by analyzing 
recent developments in the European Court of Human Rights’ 
approach to religious freedom. 
 
I. WHICH RELIGIONS, BELIEFS, OR MANIFESTATIONS ARE 
WORTHY OF PROTECTION? 
 
How serious does a belief have to be in order to deserve 
protection? While U.K. courts and the European Court of Human 
Rights have said such a belief must “attain a certain level of 
cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance,”12 what does that 
mean? How do you draw the line between “beliefs” and 
                                                          
11 Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115881. 
12 Williamson, [2005] UKHL 15 at [23]; Eweida, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 
para. 81. 
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convictions that are idealistic, scientific, or political? What about 
beliefs that are offensive or discriminatory? What if you are the 
only person who holds your particular belief or you interpret your 
religion in an idiosyncratic way? 
These are questions that some find contentious. But in 
general, a human rights-based approach lends itself to a generous 
interpretation of the concept of what constitutes religion and 
belief for the purposes of defining the scope of legal protection. 
The seriousness of the belief, the extent to which it affects others, 
and the number of people sharing it might all be relevant factors 
in deciding whether any interference is justified, but it is surely 
better not to shut out certain beliefs from being protected at all. 
The last thing we want are judges—or employers, for that 
matter—making value judgments about the types of beliefs that 
are worthy of respect. 
This is broadly what the House of Lords, formerly Britain’s 
highest domestic court, was contemplating in Williamson.13 One 
of the judges in the court below, the Court of Appeal, had 
thought that a belief in the principle of “spare the rod and spoil 
the child” did not qualify for protection as a religious belief at 
all.14 However, that view was firmly rejected by the House of 
Lords.15 Lord Nicholls said: 
When the genuineness of a claimant’s 
professed belief is an issue in the proceedings the 
court will inquire into and decide this issue as a 
question of fact. This is a limited inquiry. The 
court is concerned to ensure an assertion of 
religious belief is made in good faith: “neither 
fictitious, nor capricious, and that it is not an 
artifice”, . . . . But, emphatically, it is not for the 
court to embark on an inquiry into the asserted 
belief and judge its “validity” by some objective 
standard such as the source material upon which 
                                                          
13 See Williamson, [2005] UKHL 15. 
14 Regina (Williamson & Others) v. Sec’y of State for Educ. & Empl’t, 
[2002] EWCA (Civ) 1926, [23], [2003] QB 1300 at 1310 (Eng.). 
15 Williamson, [2005] UKHL 15 at [87].  
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the claimant founds his belief or the orthodox 
teaching of the religion in question or the extent to 
which the claimant’s belief conforms to or differs 
from the views of others professing the same 
religion. Freedom of religion protects the 
subjective belief of an individual. [R]eligious belief 
is intensely personal and can easily vary from one 
individual to another. Each individual is at liberty 
to hold his own religious beliefs, however 
irrational or inconsistent they may seem to some, 
however surprising.16 
 
A. What Beliefs Are Worthy of Protection: The Approach of 
the U.K. Employment Appeal Tribunal  
 
The U.K. Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) considered 
the scope of the concept of “philosophical belief” in McClintock 
v. Department of Constitutional Affairs.17 The case concerned a 
magistrate who refused to officiate because he might have had to 
decide whether children should be placed for adoption with same-
sex partners and then resigned from his role in family law cases.18 
The magistrate claimed that, in breach of the 2003 Regulations, 
he had been discriminated against on the basis of his 
philosophical beliefs. He did not say that he believed adoption by 
same sex couples was wrong as a matter of principle; just that he 
thought that there was no convincing evidence that it could be in 
a child’s best interests.19 It also appears that the magistrate would 
have been willing to change his mind in light of further 
research.20  
The EAT adopted the test for “philosophical belief” set out by 
the European Court of Human Rights in Campbell & Cosans v. 
                                                          
16 Id. at [22]. 
17 McClintock v. Dep’t of Constitutional Affairs, [2007] I.R.L.R. 29, 
available at 2007 WL 3130902. 
18 Id. at [4]. 
19 Id. at [7]. 
20 Id. 
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United Kingdom:21 that the belief must have sufficient cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion, and importance, and be worthy of respect 
in a democratic society.22 The EAT found that because Mr. 
McClintock had never framed his objections on the basis of any 
religious or philosophical belief, he fell outside the scope of the 
2003 Regulations. The tribunal had correctly observed that it is 
not enough “to have an opinion based on some real or perceived 
logic or based on information or lack of information available.”23 
McClintock demonstrates that while the courts will not judge 
the “validity” of a claimant’s belief—a possibility ruled out in 
Williamson—it will consider whether the purported belief is in 
fact a belief based on principle, rather than a mere opinion based 
on the available evidence. As it happens, if Mr. McClintock had 
maintained a protected belief that it was simply wrong for same-
sex couples to adopt, then the outcome would surely have been 
the same. But if religion is to enjoy neither a punished nor 
privileged status in society, and accepting that all human beings 
are to some extent creatures of logic and emotion, faith and 
reason, there is no real justification for attempting to distinguish a 
deeply held belief based on evidence from one taken on faith.  
The scope of protection for religious and philosophical beliefs 
in the U.K. has undoubtedly been extended by Grainger Plc v. 
Nicholson, the “green martyr” case.24 Mr. Nicholson had been 
dismissed by the defendant and the defendant claimed that the 
dismissal was due to redundancy.25 Mr. Nicholson claimed that 
he was discriminated against based on his asserted philosophical 
belief in relation to climate change and the environment.26 The 
question for some might be: why would a climate change 
campaigner want a tribunal to treat his convictions as a 
“philosophical belief” rather than as a scientific fact? The cynical 
                                                          
21 Campbell & Cosans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7511/76 , 4 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 293 (1982).  
22 Id. at para. 36. 
23 McClintock, [2007] I.R.L.R. 29 at [45]. 
24 Grainger Plc v. Nicholson, [2010] I.C.R. 360, available at 
http://www.bailii.org/U.K./cases/U.K.EAT/2009/0219_09_0311.html. 
25 Id. at [2]. 
26 Id. 
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answer would be that it was the only way he could challenge his 
dismissal. But actually, it seems the belief in issue was much 
more than just a belief in climate change itself. It was also a 
belief that we are all morally obliged to take urgent steps to 
address the causes of climate change though our lifestyles and any 
other means available. The EAT said that a belief of this kind—
provided it was of a similar cogency or status to a religious 
belief—could fall within the legal framework designed to protect 
faith and conscience in the workplace.27 If Mr. Nicholson was 
made redundant simply for holding this belief, then why 
shouldn’t he be entitled to a remedy from the Tribunal? 
In his judgment, Justice Burton summarized the limitations on 
the concept of “philosophical belief”: 
(i)   The belief must be genuinely held. 
(ii)  It must be a belief and not . . . an opinion or 
viewpoint based on the present state of 
information available. 
(iii) It must be a belief as to a weighty and 
substantial aspect of human life and 
behaviour. 
(iv) It must attain a certain level of cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion and importance. 
(v)  It must be worthy of respect in a democratic 
society, be not incompatible with human 
dignity and not conflict with the fundamental 
rights of others. 28 
The scope of protection was considered again in Power v. 
Greater Manchester Police Authority.29 Alan Power, a former 
employee of the Police Authority, claimed that he was dismissed 
because of his spiritualist faith and that his belief that psychics 
should be used in criminal investigations.30 The judge in the 
Employment Tribunal found that a belief in life after death and 
the capacity to communicate with spirits “on the other side” had 
                                                          
27 Id. at [26]. 
28 Id. at [24]. 
29 Power v. Greater Manchester Police Auth., [2010] U.K.EAT 
0087_10_0810, available at 2010 WL 4790841.  
30 Id. at [3]–[7]. 
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the necessary cogency, seriousness, cohesion, and importance to 
qualify as a belief worthy of respect in a democratic society. The 
EAT upheld this decision and found that the test adopted in 
Grainger was satisfied.31 
 
B. Beliefs Held by Few People: The Approach of the 
European Court of Human Rights 
 
The cases decided by the U.K. EAT, discussed above, 
demonstrate the breadth of the different types of beliefs that are 
capable of protection in the U.K. What, though, about those 
beliefs held by very few people? As Lord Nicholls recogized in 
Williamson, religious belief is “intensely personal,”32 and it 
would seem odd for protection to depend on whether the belief in 
question is shared by others who are also put at a disadvantage. 
However,  that appeared to be the effect of the EAT’s 
judgment in the case of Eweida v. British Airways Plc.33 The 
issue in that case was whether British Airways’ (“BA”) uniform 
policy—which prohibited Ms. Eweida from wearing a small cross 
around her neck—was indirectly discriminatory on religious 
grounds and therefore needed  justification. Although it was not 
in dispute that Ms. Eweida was a committed Christian, and that it 
was a genuine and important part of her faith to wear her cross 
visibly, the EAT found that there was no indirect discrimination 
because Ms. Eweida had not shown that BA’s uniform policy 
disadvantaged Christians as a group.34 
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the EAT35 
because there was no evidence that any other BA employee had 
ever requested to wear a visible cross, or been deterred from 
                                                          
31 Id. at [17]. 
32 Regina (Williamson & Others) v. Secretary of State for Educ. & 
Empl’t, [2005] UKHL 15, [2005] 2 A.C. 246 [22]. 
33 Eweida v. British Airways Plc, [2009] I.C.R. 303 (Eng.), available at 
2008 WL 4975445. Liberty represented Nadia Eweida in proceedings before 
the national courts.  
34 Id. at [62]–[63]. 
35 Eweida v. British Airways Plc, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 80, [2010] I.C.R. 
890 (Eng.), available at 2010 WL 442383. 
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doing so.36 Liberty argued that indirect discrimination should not 
require a manifestation of belief to be shared between a group of 
people with the same protected characteristic.37 Specifically, that 
religion and the manifestation of belief is a deeply personal 
matter and a human rights-based approach should be sensitive to 
a genuine personal assessment of the requirements a faith places 
on its adherents.38 Whether an act is a “manifestation” of what is 
found to be a sincerely held religious belief should be judged by 
the believer, him or herself. Care must be taken to avoid 
engaging in any assessment of the validity of the belief that drives 
certain actions.  
Ms. Eweida successfully pursued her claim in the European 
Court of Human Rights, under claims found through Article 9, 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and 
Article 14, the right to be free from discrimination.39  During its 
judgment, the court considered the scope of the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience, and religion. It reiterated that this right 
protects views that attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, 
cohesion, and importance. The court indicated that the view 
reaches this level, and the state’s duty of neutrality and 
impartiality is incompatible with any action by the state to assess 
the legitimacy of someone’s religious beliefs or the way in which 
those beliefs are expressed.40 
However, the court acknowledged that not every act  
which is in some way inspired, motivated or 
influenced by it constitutes a “manifestation” of 
the belief. Thus, for example, acts or omissions 
which do not directly express the belief concerned 
or which are only remotely connected to a precept 
of faith fall outside the protection of Article 9, § 1.  
In order to count as a “manifestation” within the 
meaning of Article 9, the act in question must be 
                                                          
36 Id. at [8], [38]. 
37 Id. at [7]. 
38 See Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115881. 
39 Id. at para. 95. 
40 Id. at para. 81. 
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intimately linked to the religion or belief. An 
example would be an act of worship or devotion 
which forms part of the practice of a religion or 
belief in a generally recognized form. However, 
the manifestation of religion or belief is not limited 
to such acts; the existence of a sufficiently close 
and direct nexus between the act and the 
underlying belief must be determined on the facts 
of each case. In particular, there is no requirement 
on the applicant to establish that he or she acted in 
fulfilment of a duty mandated by the religion in 
question.41 
The court considered that Ms. Eweida’s insistence on wearing 
a cross visibly at work was a manifestation of her religious belief 
and that “the domestic authorities failed sufficiently to protect the 
first applicant’s right to manifest her religion.”42 This was the 
case notwithstanding that there was no evidence that any other 
BA employee wished to manifest his or her religion in this way.43  
The court found that BA’s uniform policy pursued a 
legitimate aim “to communicate a certain image of the company 
and to promote recognition of its brand and staff.”44 However, it 
noted that Ms. Eweida’s desire to manifest her religious belief 
was a fundamental right “because a healthy democratic society 
needs to tolerate and sustain pluralism and diversity; but also 
because of the value to an individual who has made religion a 
central tent of his or her life to be able to communicate that belief 
to others.”45 The court found that the domestic courts had given 
too much weight to BA’s desire to maintain a certain corporate 
image, especially since Ms. Eweida’s cross was discrete and did 
not detract from her appearance, and there was no evidence that it 
would have impacted BA’s brand or image.46 Moreover, BA was 
able to amend its uniform policy to allow for the wearing of 
                                                          
41 Id. at para. 82 (citations omitted). 
42 Id. at para. 95. 
43 Id. at para. 94. 
44 Id. at para. 93. 
45 Id. at para. 94. 
46 Id. 
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religious symbolic jewelry, which demonstrated that the 
prohibition was not fundamentally important.47  
The European Court’s finding that Ms. Eweida’s rights were 
breached even though no other BA employee had been shown to 
have been affected by the rule is the correct approach. A 
particular method of manifesting a belief does not need to be 
widely shared to be worthy of protection. 
 
C. Beliefs Held by Few People: The Approach of the U.K. 
Tax Tribunal 
 
The European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Eweida 
was applied by the first-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) in 
Blackburn v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners.48 The 
claimants were members of the Seventh-day Adventist Church 
who were refused an exemption from a requirement to file VAT 
returns online on religious grounds.49 The judge found if he had 
to make a decision purely using the normal rules of construction, 
without reference to the Human Rights Act 1998, he would have 
found that the claimants were not entitled to an exemption.50 
While the claimants were members of the Seventh-day Adventist 
Church, the Church did not consider its beliefs to be incompatible 
with the use of electronic communications.51 Indeed, the 
claimants did not object to the use of all electronic 
communications, but just to the use of computers, the internet, 
television, and mobile phones.52 However, the judge reached a 
different conclusion in light of the claimants’ rights under Article 
9.53  
Continuing the reasoning applied in Eweida, the judge took a 
                                                          
47 Id. 
48 Blackburn v. Revenue & Customs Comm’rs, [2013] U.K.FTT 525 
(TC), available at http://www.bailii.org/U.K./cases/U.K.FTT/TC/2013/ 
TC02913.pdf. 
49 Id. at [12], [16]. 
50 Id. at [33]. 
51 Id. at [12]. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at [44]–[62]. 
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broad approach to the assessment of whether the claimant’s 
Article 9 rights were violated and found that the claimants were 
manifesting their religious beliefs through their refusal to use 
computers.54 While the Revenue and Customs Commissioners did 
accept that the claimants’ beliefs attained the necessary “level of 
cogency, seriousness, cohesion, and importance to obtain 
protection” under Article 955  they still argued that there was not 
a “sufficiently close and direct nexus between the act and the 
underlying belief.”56 The judge rejected this argument saying: 
Indeed, as [the claimant] explained it, in shunning 
computers he and his wife are acting in what they 
see as fulfilment of a duty mandated by their 
religion, in that he and his wife believe that they 
must act in accordance with their conscience in 
order to be judged righteous at the second coming. 
And their conscience dictated that they shun 
computers. In this, therefore, it is apparent to me 
the manifestation of their religious beliefs in 
shunning computers is acting in fulfilment of a 
duty mandated by their religion as they perceive it 
to be. This is clearly within the meaning of 
“manifestation” in Article 9 as explained by the 
ECHR in [Eweida v. United Kingdom].57 
The judge found that the requirement to file VAT returns 
online was in fact a restriction on the claimants’ rights under 
Article 9 and that there was no justification for the restriction.58 
These cases demonstrate the effectiveness of a practical human 
rights based approach to the protection of religious and 
philosophical beliefs. The courts correctly acknowledge that it 
would be inappropriate to adopt a narrow definition of “belief” in 
order to exclude protection of certain groups. Furthermore, the 
courts recognize that a measure does not need to affect a wide 
                                                          
54 Id. at [52]. 
55 Id. at [50]. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at [51]–[52]. 
58 Id. at [59]–[62]. 
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group of people who share the same beliefs in order to infringe 
on a person’s right to express his or her belief; even beliefs held 
by a small minority are worthy of protection. 
 
II. HOW FAR MUST WE GO TO ACCOMMODATE THE 
MANIFESTATION OF BELIEFS? 
 
Real respect for freedom of thought, conscience, and belief 
requires that we be slow to interfere, doing so only when such 
intervention is necessary and proportionate to protecting the 
rights and freedoms of others. Generally, it is easier to justify 
intervention in the context of young children than with adults. It 
is also easier to justify intervention in the context of employment 
when a public official, in particular, cannot practically perform 
his or her reasonable duties or refuses to apply the law of the land 
and the principle of non-discrimination to those that he or she 
serves. Intervention is also easier to justify with regard to the 
provision of goods and services when those engaged in 
commercial activity seek to discriminate when deciding who they 
will and will not serve. 
 
A. The Religious Beliefs of Public Officials 
 
The question of how to deal with religious beliefs that are 
discriminatory in nature has recently come to the forefront in a 
number of important cases involving public officials. One such 
case involved Ms. Ladele, a Christian registrar in Islington 
Council who said that she could not conduct Civil Partnerships 
because it would involve her participation in creating a union that 
was “contrary to God’s laws.”59 Although an Employment 
Tribunal originally upheld Ms. Ladele’s claim that she had been 
directly and indirectly discriminated against on grounds of her 
religion, that decision was reversed by the EAT.60 Ms. Ladele’s 
appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal, since the local 
                                                          
59 Ladele v. Islington London Borough Council, [2009] EWCA Civ. 
1357, at [10] (Eng.). 
60 Id. at [3]. It is believed that Liberty was the first NGO to ever intervene 
in the Tribunal in the public interest. 
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authority was pursuing the legitimate aim of providing effective 
service by requiring Ms. Ladele to be designated as a registrar 
for civil partnerships.61 The court also found that the local 
authority was complying with its overarching policy of being 
committed to the promotion of equal opportunities, which 
required its employees to act in a way that does not discriminate 
against others.62  
Ms. Ladele complained to the European Court of Human 
Rights,63 which found that there had been no breach of Ms. 
Ladele’s rights under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9.64 
Unfortunately, while the European Court upheld the U.K.’s 
position, it found that the issue fell within the Contracting States’ 
margin of appreciation.65 The court noted that the consequences 
for Ms. Ladele were particularly serious as her refusal to be 
designated as a civil partnership registrar resulted in her facing 
disciplinary action and losing her job.66 However, the national 
authorities were pursuing a legitimate aim and they had not 
exceeded the wide margin of appreciation that the court generally 
allows national authorities when balancing competing rights.67 
The local authority had offered Ms. Ladele a compromise 
whereby she would be required to carry out straightforward 
                                                          
61 Id. 
62 Id. at [40]. 
63 Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115881. 
64 Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights states:  
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status. 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
art. 14, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 230 [hereinafter European Convention 
on Human Rights]. Article 14 does not provide a freestanding right not to be 
discriminated against, and in order to rely on Article 14, a claimant must be 
able to show that another of their rights under the Convention is engaged. 
65 Eweida, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 61. 
66 Id. at para. 102. 
67 Id. at para. 106. 
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signings of the civil partnership register and administrative work 
in connection with civil partnerships, but she would not be 
required to conduct ceremonies.68  
This case is perhaps a paradigm of a justified interference 
with someone’s expression of his or her religion. Ms. Ladele was 
a public official who would not carry out functions which she 
thought conflicted with her beliefs, notwithstanding that those 
functions had been introduced by a democratically elected 
Parliament, and the refusal to do the work amounted to unlawful 
discrimination. Islington’s stance was not based on practicality—it 
could have provided the civil partnerships service without her—
but was a matter of principle. The local authority could not be 
seen as condoning unlawful discrimination. 
It would be nonsense if Islington were obliged to 
accommodate Ms. Ladele’s belief on the one hand, and have a 
duty not to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation on the 
other. Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is now 
unlawful in the U.K. and is treated equally with discrimination 
based on race, sex, and indeed religious discrimination. It would 
undermine the whole system of equality protection if public 
officials were allowed to engage in what would otherwise be 
unlawful discrimination because of their personal beliefs. 
 
B. The Religious Beliefs of Those Providing Goods and 
Services to the Public 
 
In a recent case the U.K. Supreme Court had to decide the 
issue of how far we should go to accommodate religious belief. 
The case of Bull v. Hall69 involved Christian bed and breakfast 
owners who turned away a gay couple—who had booked a double 
room—because of a sincerely held belief that sexual intercourse 
outside of traditional marriage is sinful.70 The court used the 
broad approach to the assessment of Article 971 rights taken in 
                                                          
68 Id. at para. 26. 
69 Bull v. Hall, [2013] U.K.SC 73, available at 2013 WL 6148231. 
70 Id. at [9]–[10]. 
71 Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides:  
2014.04.24 CHAKRABARTI.DOCX 5/11/2014  11:38 AM 
500 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Eweida and Blackburn, but while the court accepted that the right 
to manifest religious belief was clearly engaged, the reasoning in 
Ladele prevailed.72 Supreme Court Justice Lady Hale, strongly 
made the case that the moniker of religious freedom did not 
sanction discrimination in the provision of goods and services: 
Homosexuals . . . were long denied the possibility 
of fulfilling themselves through relationships with 
others. This was an affront to their dignity as 
human beings which our law has now (some would 
say belatedly) recognised. Homosexuals can enjoy 
the same freedom and the same relationships as 
any others. But we should not underestimate the 
continuing legacy of those centuries of 
discrimination, persecution even, which is still 
going on in many parts of the world. It is no doubt 
for that reason that Strasbourg requires “very 
weighty reasons” to justify discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation. It is for that reason 
that we should be slow to accept that prohibiting 
hotel keepers from discriminating against 
homosexuals is a disproportionate limitation on 
their right to manifest their religion.73 
This conclusion aligned with Liberty’s intervention before the 
U.K. Supreme Court in this case. Liberty argued that the better 
approach to balancing competing rights is to broadly read Article 
9, treat the limitation as interference, and when it comes to the 
                                                          
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion 
or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.  
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 64, art. 9. 
72 Bull, [2013] U.K.SC 73. 
73 Id. at [53]. 
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issue of justification, give significant weight to the importance of 
affording lesbians and gay men equality in accessing services and 
in the enjoyment of other social privileges. The court also made it 
clear that its decision was not a matter of preferring one protected 
characteristic or one set of rights to another. The result would 
have been the same if a gay hotel owner sought to turn away a 
Christian couple on the grounds of their beliefs.74  
When sexual orientation regulations first came into force in 
the U.K., there was considerable debate about whether 
exemptions should be allowed on religious grounds leading to 
some concessions. Religious bodies continue to be allowed to 
discriminate on the grounds of sexual orientation in certain 
limited circumstances.75 Those lines are drawn by Parliament and 
those individuals who disagree with those lines should lobby for a 
change in the law. However, no individual can ask their employer 
or the courts to extend the scope of the exemptions.  I accept that 
it is difficult for people who are in public or business roles to 
adapt to changes in the law with which they fundamentally 
disagree, but which also have a significant impact on how they 
conduct their role or business. But that’s what it means to live in 
a democracy and you either accept it or, if you feel that strongly 
about it, you should find another job. There comes a time when 
the pacifist has to leave the army rather than insist on his pacifism 
therein.  
There will be many other cases that are not as clear cut as 
those described above, and it is the task of employers and courts 
to try to come to sensible conclusions. One such example is the 
case of the Christian bus driver who refused to drive buses 
carrying the slogan “There’s probably no god.”76 His employer 
recognized that this might be upsetting for him and agreed to try 
                                                          
74 Id. at [54]. 
75 For example, the exemptions from employment equality legislation 
allow religious employers to discriminate against potential applicants for jobs 
on grounds of religion or belief and of sexual orientation, and to discriminate 
against current employees on those same grounds. The Equality Act, 2010, c. 
15, § 196, sch. 23 (U.K.). 
76 Man Refuses to Drive “No God” Bus, BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.U.K./2/hi/U.K._news/england/hampshire/7832647.stm. 
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to put him on other routes, as long as this did not inconvenience 
other drivers.77 The driver accepted this and agreed that if it 
became impracticable to accommodate him, he would have to 
find another job.78 Sadly, those sorts of stories of tolerance and 
common sense are either rare, or more likely, rarely reported. 
The cases of Ladele and Bull v. Hall demonstrate that 
interference with respect for religious freedom in the provision of 
public and business services can be justified. For example such 
interferences may be justified in particular security or safety 
scenarios where an item of clothing must be temporarily removed 
to allow for a respectful identity check at an airport or sterile 
conditions in parts of a hospital. But the rights and freedoms of 
others, in my view, do not include protection from difference, 
irritation, and offense, as opposed to real harm, whether the 
individual concerned is in a religious, political, or other minority. 
 
C. The Right to Wear Religious Clothing in Public: The 
French Approach 
 
An example of grossly disproportionate interference with 
religious freedom is the recent introduction in France of a law 
banning the wearing of clothing designed to conceal the face in 
public spaces.79 The law imposes penalties on individuals who 
coerce others into wearing clothing that covers their face and on 
those wearing such clothing.80 There are only limited exceptions 
to the ban, for example: clothing permitted by law or on medical 
or other grounds, worn for sport, festivities, or artistic or 
traditional events.81 Although the law is framed in neutral terms, 
one effect is to prohibit the wearing of the burkha in public 
                                                          
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du 
visage dans l’espace public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 on the 
Prohibition of Concealing the Face in Public Space], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 12, 
2010, p. 18344. 
80 Id. arts. 3, 4. 
81 Id. art. 1. 
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places, and it is a troubling example of the rising anti-Islamic 
sentiment in Europe.82  
The French law has been challenged in the European Court of 
Human Rights and was recently transferred to the Grand 
Chamber where judgment is pending.83 The challenge was 
brought by a devout Muslim French national who wears a burkha 
and niqab84 because of her faith, culture, and personal 
convictions, and who is not pressured to do so by her husband or 
her family. The applicant is happy not to wear the niqab in 
certain circumstances, but would like to have the option of 
wearing it in public. The applicant is relying on Articles 3 
(prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment), 8 
(right to respect for private and family life), 9 (right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion), 10 (right to freedom of 
expression), 11 (right to freedom of assembly and association), 
and 14 (prohibition on discrimination) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.85 Liberty has intervened in the 
application and argued that the French ban is an unjustified 
interference with various human rights.86 Our submission was 
based on three propositions. 
First, the law clearly interferes with freedom of religion. 
Following the decision of the European Court in Eweida,87 it is 
                                                          
82 See, e.g., Homa Khaleeli, Islamophobic Hate Crime: Is It Getting 
Worse?, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/U.K./ 
2013/jun/05/islamophobic-hate-crime-getting-worse; Christine Ogan, et al., 
The Rise of Anti-Muslim Prejudice: Media and Islamophobia in Europe and 
the United States, 76 INT’L COMM. GAZETTE 46 (2014);  
83 Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber 
Hearing Concerning the Prohibition on Wearing the Full-Face Veil in Public in 
France (Nov. 27, 2013). 
84  Id. There are many different recognized spellings of “niqab.” I will 
adopt this spelling throughout this article, except in quotations that use another 
recognized spelling. 
85 See Brief for Intervenor at 5–7, S.A.S. v. France,  
App. No. 43835/11, available at http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.U.K./ 
sites/default/files/SAS%20v%20France%20-%20Written%20Subs.pdf; see 
also European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 64, art. 3, 8–11, 14. 
86 Brief for Intervenor, S.A.S. v. France, at 5–7. 
87 Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at 
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clear that it is not for a court to decide whether the applicant’s 
choice to wear a veil is a valid manifestation of her religion.  Nor 
is it a court’s role to question the extent to which other members 
of the applicant’s religious group share her belief in the 
importance of wearing the burkha and niqab. In previous cases, 
the European court had dismissed claims for religious 
discrimination in the employment context because the applicants 
could choose to resign from their position if it conflicted with 
their religious beliefs.88 The court moved away from this 
approach in Eweida, but even if it had not done so, these cases 
can be distinguished from the French ban—women who wish to 
wear a burkha in public do not have the option of resigning to 
avoid the impact of the law; it affects every aspect of their lives. 
Second, the ban interferes with an applicant’s right with 
respect to her private and family life under Article 8 because it 
affects her ability to establish a social life and develop 
relationships with others. The ban also affects the applicant’s 
right, under Article 10, to express her faith by wearing a burkha. 
Third, the effect of the law is discriminatory as it significantly 
disadvantages Muslim women who choose to wear the burkha. 
The French law appears to have three potential justifications: (1) 
it is contrary to Republican values for a person to be cut off from 
others; (2) there may be a danger to public safety; and (3) the 
wearing of the burkha is a public manifestation of a lack of 
equality between men and women. Liberty, however, argued that 
these interferences with individuals’ human rights cannot be 
justified. 
On closer inspection, these justifications are flawed. Whilst 
secularism is an important value in France, the law specifically 
affects the wearing of the burkha but does not prevent people 
from wearing other religious dress or symbols. There is no sound 
reason for this difference in treatment. Security concerns also do 
not provide an answer. A requirement to remove a face covering 
in certain circumstances may be justified, but a complete ban on 
                                                          
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115881. 
88 See, e.g., id. at para. 83; Stedman v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. 
Rep 20 (1997); Konttinen v. Finland, App. No. 24949/94, 87 Eur. Comm’n 
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 68 (1996).  
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wearing the burkha is clearly disproportionate. Many women who 
wear the burkha would be willing to show their faces for 
identification purposes and it is not clear that the existing French 
laws regarding identity checks provide insufficient protection for 
public security. Finally, while promoting equality is an important 
aim, punishing women for expressing their faith does not support 
equality. A law based on clumsy assumptions about what drives a 
woman to wear the veil disregards her individual autonomy. By 
forcing women to comply with a particular notion of equality, the 
law undermines their dignity as women and as Muslims and has 
the effect of barring them from some public spaces altogether.89  
 
D. The Right to Wear Religious Clothing in Public: the U.K. 
Approach 
 
The issues surrounding the wearing of religious clothing in 
public are not limited to France and have been considered in the 
U.K. One example is the case of Azmi, which concerned a 
classroom assistant who was not allowed to wear a niqab.90 
Although the school’s decision to refuse to allow Azmi to wear 
the niqab was ultimately found to be justified, the EAT rigorously 
scrutinized the school’s reasons.91 This was an unusual case 
because a religious dress requirement arguably did have a 
negative impact on others. Ms. Azmi’s job primarily involved 
language support for pupils for whom English was not their first 
language. She was permitted to wear the niqab outside the 
classroom but not while teaching. General research and 
observation of her teaching showed that language support could 
be carried out more effectively if her face was visible. On that 
basis, the EAT decided that the school’s approach was not 
unlawful.92 
                                                          
89 It is important to note that the applicants in these cases do not consider 
themselves to be pressured into wearing the burkha and the niqab, but rather, 
it is an expression of their religious faith. 
90 Azmi v. Kirklees Metro. Borough Council, [2007] I.C.R. 1154 (Eng.). 
91 Id. at [62]–[74]. 
92 Id. at [66], [80]. One interesting aspect of the case was that Ms. Azmi 
suggested that the situation could be resolved by isolating her from male 
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A similar issue was considered by the House of Lords, 
formerly the U.K.’s highest court, in the cases of R (SB) v. Head 
Teacher and Governors of Denbigh High School93 and R (X) v. 
Head Teacher and Governors of Y School.94 These cases 
concerned claims by Muslim girls who asserted a right to wear a 
jilbab and a niqab, respectively, at school. The court dismissed 
these claims on the basis that there was no interference with the 
girls’ right to freedom of religion under Article 9 because they 
could have gone to schools that would have allowed them to wear 
the religious garments.95   
A more recent example involves the issue of whether a 
defendant charged with witness intimidation should be allowed to 
wear the niqab during a trial in the Crown Court.96 In his 
judgment on September 16, 2013, H.H. Judge Peter Murphy set 
out general principles on when defendants in the Crown Court 
should be allowed to wear clothing that covers their face.97 The 
judge gave detailed consideration to the human rights issues 
involved. He noted the importance of the right to freedom of 
religion, but stated that the corollary of this right is a duty to 
respect legal institutions and a court’s rules and practices. The 
judge also considered the fundamental requirements of an 
adversarial trial and the need for the court to be able to judge the 
defendant’s reaction and to prevent the defendant from being 
immunized from effective cross-examination. Furthermore, in 
order to protect the administration of justice, the court—and not 
                                                          
teachers. The school refused to do this, which was surely right because it 
could have led to claims of direct sex discrimination by male teachers. 
93 R (on the Application of Begum) v. Headteacher & Governors of 
Denbigh High Sch., [2006] UKHL 15, available at 2006 WL 690559. 
94 R (on the application of X) v. Headteachers of Y Sch., [2007] EWHC 
298 (Admin) (Eng.), available at 2007 WL 675365. 
95 See Begum, [2006] UKHL 15, at [25]; Application of X, [2007] 
EWHC, 298 at [40].  
96 The Queen v. D(R), Judgment of H.H. Judge Peter  
Murphy In Relation to Wearing Niqaab by Defendant During  
Proceedings in Crown Court (Sept. 16, 2013) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.judiciary.gov.U.K./Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/The%2
0Queen%20-v-%20D%20(R).pdf.  
97 Id. 
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the defendant—must be in control of its procedure.98 
The judge recognized the importance of wearing a niqab to 
many Muslin women. He said: 
I also recognise the intrinsic merit which the 
niqaab has in the eyes of women who wear it. I 
reject the view, which has its adherents among the 
public and the press, that the niqaab is somehow 
incompatible with participation in public life in 
England and Wales; or is nothing more than a 
form of abuse, imposed under the guise of 
religion, on women by men. There may be 
individual cases where that is true. But the niqaab 
is worn by choice by many spiritually-minded, 
thoughtful and intelligent women, who do not 
deserve to be demeaned by superficial and 
uninformed criticisms of their choice. The Court 
must consider the potential positive benefits of the 
niqaab.99 
In the end, the judge conducted a balancing exercise between 
the defendant’s right to freedom of religion and the rights of 
others involved in the trial such as the victims, the jurors, and the 
rights of the public generally. He concluded that it would be 
appropriate to have some restrictions on when a niqab could be 
worn during the trial and set out principles on how the issues 
should be dealt with. For example, a female officer could be 
asked to confirm the defendant’s identity to the court, and while 
the defendant would have to remove the niqab to give evidence, 
she could give evidence behind a screen or by video link so that 
she could not be seen by the general public. 
The H.H. Judge Peter Murphy found that restrictions on the 
nijab in court furthered the legitimate aim of protecting the fair 
and effective running of the criminal courts. He also held that 
some restrictions on the defendant’s right to freedom of religion 
were necessary and proportionate to uphold the rule of law in a 
                                                          
98 Id. 
99 Id. at para. 67. 
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democratic society.100 This judgment is an example of a court 
adopting a nuanced, principled, and practical approach that 
respects a defendant’s religious convictions while protecting the 
administration of justice. This can be contrasted with the blanket 
ban in France on wearing the burkha or niqab in public, which is 
dismissive of an individual’s right to express his or her religious 
convictions. 
Unfortunately, not everybody in the U.K. adopts such a 
sensible approach to this issue. There have been calls for the 
U.K. to introduce a ban—similar to the one introduced in 
France101—on wearing a burkha in public. A Conservative 
Member of Parliament, Philip Hollobone, has introduced a 
private member’s bill, the Face Coverings (Prohibition) Bill, 
which would make it an offense for a person to wear a garment 
with the primary purpose of obscuring one’s face in a public 
place.102 While the U.K. government does not support the Bill, 
and it currently has little prospect of success, its mere 
introduction demonstrates the rising tide of intolerance that is 
sweeping across Europe.103 This trend is further evidenced by a 
recent YouGov poll conducted in the U.K. in September 2013 
that showed that 61% of British adults agreed with the statement: 
“the burka should be banned in Britain.”104 It is to be welcomed, 
therefore, that the European Court of Human Rights has been 
developing a more thoughtful approach to religious freedom in its 
recent cases.   
                                                          
100 Id. at paras. 81–85. 
101 See Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 (Fr.), supra note 79. 
102 Face Coverings (Prohibition) Bill, 2013-14, H.C. Bill [31] (Eng.). 
103 See, e.g., Morgane Hoarau & Patrycja Sasnal, The Rise of 
Islamophobia in Europe, POLISH INST. INT’L AFFAIRS BULLETIN, May 27, 
2013, at 1. 
104 William Jordan, Most Still Want to Ban the Burka in Britain, YOUGOV 
(Sept. 18, 2013), http://yougov.co.U.K./news/2013/09/18/most-still-want-ban-
burka-britain/. 
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E. The Approach of the European Court of Human Rights to 
Religious Freedom 
 
The European Court’s approach, which is perhaps inevitable 
for an international court grappling with such diverse national 
traditions, initially seems to favor secularism. There are a 
number of cases in which the court said that a person is entitled 
to his or her beliefs, but there are limitations on his or her right 
to express those beliefs in the public sphere. Following this 
reasoning the court found no interference with Article 9 in the 
case of a woman who was refused permission to graduate from 
university unless she was prepared to be photographed without a 
headscarf,105 or in the case of a teacher who was not allowed time 
off to attend religious worship on a Friday.106 Even when the 
court did find that there was interference, it was often accepted 
that the restrictions were justified. One example is the court’s 
refusal to hear a complaint about a requirement mandating turban 
removal during airport security screening.107 
The European Court’s approach of favoring secularism is best 
demonstrated by the case of Dahlab v. Switzerland.108 In this case 
the European Court found that a refusal to allow a primary school 
teacher to wear the hijab (not the niqab, just the headscarf) was 
justified in view of the “powerful external symbol” that wearing a 
headscarf represented, specifically that the hijab could be seen as 
having a kind of proselytizing effect since it appeared to be 
imposed on women by a religious precept that was hard to 
reconcile with the principle of gender equality.109 The court found 
that wearing the hijab undermined the message of tolerance, 
respect for others, and equality and non-discrimination that all 
teachers in a democratic society must convey to their pupils.110 
However, in more recent cases the European Court has begun 
                                                          
105 Karaduman v. Turkey, App. No. 16278/90, 74 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. 93 (1993). 
106 Ahmad v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 126 (1981). 
107 See Phull v. France, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 409.  
108 Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R 447. 
109 Id. at 450. 
110 Id.  
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to show a greater tolerance for religion in the public sphere. A 
recent example is the case of Lautsi v. Italy,111 which concerned a 
state school in Italy that had a crucifix fixed to the wall in each of 
its classrooms.112 The applicant wanted to give her two children, 
who attended the school, a secular upbringing, and thought that 
the crucifix displays interfered with that goal.113 She claimed that 
the crucifix presentation breached her right under Article 2 of 
Protocol No. 1114 to educate her children in accordance with her 
religious and philosophical beliefs. She also claimed that it 
breached her right to freedom of religion under Article 9 and was 
discriminatory and contrary to Article 14.115 
In 2009, a chamber of the court adopted the secularist 
approach and found that there had been a breach of Article 2 of 
Protocol No. 1 and Article 9.116 The court found that the state had 
“an obligation to refrain from imposing beliefs, even indirectly, 
in places where persons are dependent on it or in places where 
they were particularly vulnerable.”117 It noted that in countries 
where the majority of the population is members of one religion, 
the use of the symbols of that religion without restriction as to 
place and manner could constitute pressure on students who do 
not practice that religion.118 The court found that while the 
crucifix had a number of meanings, the predominant meaning was 
a religious one.119 The crucifixes could be considered “powerful 
external symbols” and could be emotionally disturbing for 
children of other religions or those who were not religious at 
                                                          
111 Lautsi v. Italy, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 3 (2012). 
112 Id. at para. 11. 
113 Id. at para. 12. 
114 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 64, art. 2 (“No 
person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions 
which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall 
respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in 
conformity with their own religions and philosophical convictions.”). 
115 Lautsi, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 29. 
116 Id. at para. 30. 
117 Id. at para. 31. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
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all.120 The court could not see “how the display of a symbol that 
it is reasonable to associate with Catholicism . . . could serve the 
educational pluralism which is essential for the preservation of 
‘democratic society’. . . .”121 
This decision was reviewed by the Grand Chamber, which 
came to the conclusion that there had been no violation of Article 
2 of Protocol No. 1 or of Article 9.122 The Grand Chamber 
acknowledged that states are responsible for ensuring neutral and 
impartial exercise of various religions, faiths, and beliefs. It also 
noted though that states are not prohibited from imparting 
religious or philosophical knowledge either directly or 
indirectly.123 In addition, the aim of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 is 
to safeguard pluralism in education and to ensure that knowledge 
is conveyed in “an objective, critical, and pluralistic manner, 
enabling pupils to develop a critical mind.”124  
The Grand Chamber thus held that the decision to display 
crucifixes in state schools fell within the state’s “margin of 
appreciation and therefore was allowed.”125 The court said that 
they had a duty to respect states’ decisions relating to the 
organization of the school environment, and the setting and 
planning of the curriculum, provided that they did not lead to a 
form of indoctrination.126 Since the crucifix is essentially a 
passive symbol, its display alone is insufficient to denote a 
process of indoctrination and did not have the same effect as 
“didactic speech or participation in religious activities.”127 
The court’s softer approach is also demonstrated by the cases 
of Eweida and Ladele, discussed above, as well as Chaplin, and 
                                                          
120 Id. at para. 73. 
121 Id. at para. 31. 
122 The Grand Chamber is made up of seventeen judges: the court’s 
President and Vice-Presidents, the Section Presidents and the national judge, 
together with other judges selected by drawing of lots. The judgment of the 
Grand Chamber is final. 
123 Lautsi, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 at para. 60. 
124 Id. at para. 62. 
125 Id. at para. 70. 
126 Id.  
127 Id. at para. 72. 
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McFarlane, which were all heard simultaneously by the European 
Court of Human Rights.128 In its decision, the European Court 
noted that previously it had held that the possibility of resigning 
from a job meant that there was no interference with the 
employee’s religious freedom.129 However, it suggested that those 
decisions were not consistent with the court’s approach to other 
rights, such as the right to respect for private life under Article 8, 
or the right to freedom of expression under Article 10, and said: 
Given the importance in a democratic society of 
freedom of religion, the Court considers that, 
where an individual complains of a restriction on 
freedom of religion in the workplace, rather than 
holding that the possibility of changing jobs would 
negate any interference with the right, the better 
approach would be to weigh the possibility in the 
overall balance when considering whether or not 
the restriction was proportionate.130 
It is therefore clear that, from the perspective of the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, employers with policies that restrict 
their employees’ ability to manifest their religious beliefs will 
potentially be interfering with their employees’ rights under 
Article 9. The employer must then demonstrate that its policies 
are justified. The court applied this approach to the individual 
circumstances of the four claimants with differing results. The 
facts of Eweida and Ladele have already been discussed above.131 
The facts of the other two cases, Chaplin and McFarlane, also 
illustrate the court’s approach. 
Ms. Chaplin was a nurse on a geriatric ward who wished to 
wear a cross on a chain around her neck; however, this was 
contrary to the ward’s uniform policy.132 Her managers believed 
that there was a risk of injury if one of the patients pulled the 
chain or if it swung forward and came into contact with an open 
                                                          
128 Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115881. 
129 Id. at para. 83. 
130 Id. 
131 See supra Part I.A. 
132 Eweida, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 96. 
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wound.133 The court found that here the hospital’s goal of 
protecting health and safety was more important than British 
Airways’ goal of protecting its corporate image.134 In this 
instance, the court gave the domestic authorities a wide margin of 
appreciation since the hospital managers were best placed to make 
decisions about clinical safety.  
Mr. McFarlane was a counselor who, because of his orthodox 
Christian beliefs, refused to provide psycho-sexual counseling to 
same-sex couples.135 This breached his employer’s policy that 
required employees to provide services equally to heterosexual 
and homosexual couples and McFarlane was let go. The court did 
note that the loss of Mr. McFarlane’s job was a serious 
sanction.136 However, when Mr. McFarlane had begun his 
training course, he was aware of his employer’s equal 
opportunities policy and that he would not be able to filter clients 
on the ground of sexual orientation. The most important factor 
for the court was that the employer’s action was intended to 
secure its policy of providing services without discrimination.137 
The state authorities therefore had a wide margin of appreciation.  
These cases provide grounds for optimism that, when the 
Grand Chamber gives its judgment in S.A.S. v. France,138 it will 
take the opportunity to build on its recent jurisprudence in 
Eweida and Lautsi.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I have sympathy with a human rights-based approach to 
grappling with discrimination arguments, particularly in the 
context of belief. Domestic law governing faith and belief in the 
U.K. and all sensible workplace policies should be applied with 
                                                          
133 Id. 
134 Id. at paras. 98–100; see also supra Part I.B discussing Eweida v. 
British Airways Plc, [2009] I.C.R. 303 (Eng.), available at 2008 WL 
4975445. 
135 Eweida, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 107. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at paras. 108–10. 
138 S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
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the fundamental right to freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion in mind. 
I advocate for a broad and generous approach to what is 
considered a “protected religion or belief,” such as the approach 
adopted by the U.K. EAT. This approach minimizes unattractive, 
divisive, and counterproductive arguments about which personal 
beliefs are worthy and unworthy of protection per se.  
Having adopted a broad approach to what constitutes a 
protected religion or belief, it is then necessary to accommodate 
the manifestation of those beliefs and to only interfere with them 
when it is necessary and proportionate to do so in order to protect 
the rights of others. Deciding what is and is not a proportionate 
interference or unreasonable accommodation can of course be a 
tricky task in the workplace and the public sphere. There will of 
course be situations in which it is appropriate to interfere with 
those rights, the cases of Ladele and Bull v. Hall being obvious 
examples. However, the best discipline comes from testing 
alternative scenarios with the principle of non-discrimination and 
equal treatment itself. Would British Airways have banned the 
wearing of a headscarf or turban amongst its workforce? On the 
evidence, patently not. Should a council accommodate a registrar 
who refuses to officiate over mixed-race weddings? Is an atheist 
who believes that Christian doctrine is counter to the “laws of 
physics” best qualified to be a minister of that religion? I suspect 
most of us would answer my last two questions in the negative.  
It is encouraging to see the European Court of Human Rights 
moving away from a secularist approach and adopting a more 
balanced approach to issues of religious freedom that gives 
appropriate weight to individuals’ religious convictions. 
However, it is unfortunate that some national governments have 
moved the other way, as is demonstrated by the French ban on 
the wearing of the burkha or niqab in public, which undermines 
many Muslim women’s rights to express their religious beliefs. 
Nobody ever said that life in a rich, diverse democracy was 
easy, or that the public sphere and workplace wouldn’t be a place 
of occasional tension and strife. Our human rights framework 
offers a robust tool for negotiating the limits of otherwise vague 
terms like “tolerance” and “cohesion.” Inevitably, the laws that 
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afford some protection to those whose beliefs are irritating, or 
even offensive to us, protect us as well. To quote St. Matthew’s 
Gospel: “Judge not, that ye be not judged. For with what 
judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged: and with what measure ye 
mete, it shall be measured to you again.”139 Or, if you prefer a 
secular Matthew, try the words of fictional Congressman Matt 
Santos from the Gospel according to Aaron Sorkin’s The West 
Wing:  
The framers of our Constitution believed that if the 
people were to be sovereign and belong to 
different religions at the same time then our 
official religion would have to be no religion at all. 
It was a bold experiment then as it is now. It 
wasn’t meant to make us comfortable, it was meant 
to make us free.140 
 
                                                          
139 Matthew 7:1–2. 
140 The West Wing: Mr. Frost (NBC television broadcast Oct. 16, 2005). 
